フランス社会科学高等研究院のAlessandro Stanziani教授が、今年の４月から９月末までの半年間、東洋文化研究所に客員教授として滞在されます。
この間に、GHCメンバーの中島隆博先生と共同で、グローバルヒストリーに関する大学院セミナーを開催されます。詳細は、下記のプログラムをご覧ください。
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Alessandro Stanziani (Professor, EHESS) Tokyo lecures with Takahiro Nakajima (IASA, UTokyo)

Venue : room 505 at IASA（東文研3F）
Time: 15:00-18:30

April 11: Global history during the first globalization
Guest Speaker: Professor Tomoji Onozuka (Graduate School of Economics, UTokyo)

Since antiquity, and especially since the second millennium of our era there have been important connections between the Euro-Asiatic and African worlds, as well as with respect to historiographical knowledge. Voyages, along with historical methods and books, connected the Arabo-Muslim, Chinese, and Indian worlds to one another, and connected these regions to Europe and Africa. Contrary to received opinion, Renaissance Europe did not invent early modern and scholarly historiography alone, but rather borrowed from previous centuries as well as other worlds. It also added new elements, such as philology and erudition, along with law and economic and anthropological reflections about "the others." Expansion toward the East and later the Americas encouraged the globalization of history. Wonder was nevertheless accompanied by initial projects of conquest, and later by historiographical accounts emphasizing the differences between "us" and "the others." Already in the sixteenth century, Western account distinguished themselves from those of Asian empires, with the former expressing ambitions of conquest and exclusion, and the latter advancing cosmopolitan ambitions. The forms of writing global history were expressed at the time in the modes of imperial constructions.

April 18: Global history and the Enlightenment
Guest Speaker: Professor Naoko Yuge (School of Law, Waseda University)

The Enlightenment stressed these dynamics , but also provided a new perspective in which a plurality of worlds was less at issue than universalist visions in the context of civilizationist projects. The Enlightenment questioned the validity of imperial enterprises and slavery--and in the context of an overall anthropological and philosophical thought--what constitutes a human. Similar debates also took place in China, India, and the Ottoman Empire, with philosophical histories and anthropological approaches emerging there. Europe did not have a monopoly over the Enlightenment, although expectations and projects were not the same within Europe and even more so between Europe and other areas of the world. The question, of course, is not so much determining who invented and then exported "modernity" based on a scale of values fixed for one and all. Rather, we take seriously the question that the actors themselves asked during the eighteenth century: how to conceive history, its tools, and its social role in a context that is rapidly changing and, moreover, increasingly connected?
The invention of modernity responds to the fundamental question that is shared by Europe and Asia. The solution, which is also shared, can be found in a restructuring of the tools of historical knowledge: instead of erudition alone, it is the philosophy of history that is supposed to grasp historical dynamics such as transformations of the monarchy in France and Russia, of the Ching Empire in China, and the decline of the Mughals in India. The global revolutions of the years 1780-1820 were the consequence and extension of this process.

April 25: Global history and nationalism during the long 19th century
Guest Speaker: Professor Koji Yamamoto (Graduate School of Economics, UTokyo)

The invention of modern archives was one of the fruits of revolutions. In France and Mexico, Brazil and colonial India or the Russian Empire, archives reflected the architecture of power, and connected history to the construction of the nation. With Western domination during the 19th century, these new tools and methods were exported to the rest of the planet, and the opposition between orality and writing took on a new significance, that between history on the one hand, and anthropology, sociology, and "indigenous" literature on the other. In this movement, Europe and its historians invented a new chronology, with the division between ancient, medieval, and early modern gradually being affirmed. This chronology was imposed on non-European worlds that were henceforth supposed to measure their time and history according to European performances.
The philosophy of history and political philosophy of course advanced universalist pretensions during the nineteenth century, alongside those of nationalism and Eurocentrism in history. The social sciences and philosophy of the nineteenth century contributed as much as historians--if not more--the consolidation of the Eurocentric view of the world, as these thinkers presented categories and analyses that were potentially valid for part or all of Europe as universal truths. The proletariat in motion found little confirmation in England itself, and even less outside of it; democracy struggled to affirm itself in Europe, and even less elsewhere.

May 9: Global history and totalitarianism
Guest Speaker: Professor Harumi Goto-Shibata (Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, UTokyo)

Tensions between Eurocentric universalisms and nationalist histories gave rise to important contradictions that intensified beginning in the 1870s and especially with the First World War. The end of anciens régimes and empires in Europe accompanied the rise of radical nationalisms. While philosophy and universal history examined the decline of the West (Spengler) or its role in relation to other civilizations (Toynbee), the interactions between history and the social sciences was renewed in a different project, notably in France, with the Annales. However, these approaches struggled to match up with the influence of nationalism in Europe (the central political role of history in totalitarian states), but also in the Americas and Asia-with tensions, for example, in India and China surrounding history and its political role and content. During the interwar period, history in general and global history in particular expressed the failure of conceiving globality beyond national frameworks. This serves as an important warning for our current debates.

May 16: The decolonization of history
Guest Speaker: Professor Akio Tanabe (Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, UTokyo)

Decolonization, the Cold War and the welfare state dominated the postwar political landscape. This was a major turning point indeed, as colonial empires collapsed against the backdrop of the Cold War. The tools of politics, sociology, and anthropology were broadly used by historians, and inversely history was considered indispensable in economics, the social sciences, and politics. The history of "under-development" accompanied that of the system-worlds of Braudel and Wallerstein. Although these approaches sought to be global, they still preserved a profoundly Eurocentric epistemological and conceptual framework. That is the most important legacy of colonialism, along with economic dependence.
The decomposition of this world beginning in the 1970s, and even more so after 1989, opened the way for our current globalization, of which global history is a reflection. Postcolonial studies offer an invitation to rethink history by drawing on non-Western categories, although this approach does not rule out the danger of new Sinocentrisms, Indocentrisms, or nationalisms in Africa. This danger became a reality when the success of capitalism, so celebrated after 1989, led to a paradoxical result: the West won the Cold War but lost peace, as the speculative and political crises of recent years bear witness. The strength and limits of global history reflect those of the post-1989 world, and like it invite one to think globally and give a voice to non-European worlds. Yet global history too often forgets those left behind by globalization, and subsequently the force of nationalisms. It is in starting out from the current world and its history that we can imagine different solutions.

May 23: Russia in global history, Russia and global History. On modernization and its discontent
Guest Speaker: Professor Yoshiro Ikeda (Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology)

In the twentieth century, the comparative analysis of Russian history found its way into discussions of backwardness and underdevelopment, decolonization, the fate of communism and the Cold War as well as arguments such as Oriental despotism and Hayek's Road to Serfdom. Authors as different as Wallerstein and North agreed on this: in early modern times, Russia and Eastern Europe responded to the commercial, agrarian and then industrial expansion of the West by binding the peasantries to the land and its lords. It is interesting that even new approaches to world history such as Pomeranz's "great divergence," while contesting Chinese backwardness and European ethnocentrism, still considered Russia the paradigm of unfree labor and lack of markets and, as such, opposed to both the Lower Yangtzee and Britain. Osterhammel as well, in his magistral book, qualified Russia as an "exception" in Europe in terms of ending famines, introducing private property and democratic rules.
In all these approaches, the "Russian case" systematically expresses the boundary, if not the negation, of Western growth and civilisation. Russia is at the edge of global dynamics both in terms of its economic performances and from the standpoint -crucial to any approach in global history- of decentralizing Europe (or the West). When Russia is concerned, decentralizing perspectives fall apart.

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1 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York, London: Atheneum, 1974,1976); Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System (London: New Left Books, 1976); Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981).
2 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
3 Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World. A Global History of the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).